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IV. FILM AND MOTION PICTURES
A. Copyright
1. Copyright Infringement: Substantial Similarity Found Lacking
By all accounts, Hollywood is loaded with scripts in search of a
deal. When a blockbuster opens, lots of people wish they had conceived
it. Steven Spielberg's "E.T.-The Extra-Terrestrial" looked to play-
wright Lisa Litchfield very much like the illegitimate child of her unsold
play, "Lokey from Maldemar." One gray-green alien might look very
much like another to the uninitiated, but the Ninth Circuit, in Litchfield
v. Spielberg,' found no family resemblance between "Lokey from
Maldemar" and "E.T." The court held that the two works were not
substantially similar. Thus, there could be no question of copyright in-
fringement or violation of the Lanham Act.2
In 1978, Litchfield wrote a one-act musical entitled, "Lokey from
Maldemar," which chronicled the adventures of two extra-terrestrials
stranded on earth. The aliens, known as "Lokey" and "Fundinkle,"
were first befriended and later pursued by earthlings, demonstrated ex-
tra-terrestrial powers, and traveled from the North Pole to Japan and the
Andes Mountains before finally returning home. The play was per-
formed a few times in Los Angeles, and Litchfield tried to find a pro-
ducer for a motion picture version of the work. Defendant Universal
rejected the script as "unsuitable for motion picture development," and
Litchfield's later attempts to sell the "screenplay outline" were equally
unsuccessful.'
In 1982, Spielberg's "E.T." burst on the horizon, opening to huge
commercial success and critical acclaim. "E.T." was the story of a little
lost alien accidentally left behind on earth. Driven by hunger and curios-
ity to a suburban California home, E.T. met and was befriended by a
young boy, for whom he demonstrated extra-terrestrial powers. Earth-
lings later pursued him. He appeared to expire, but revived when his
fellows returned for him.
1. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 1358. See Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (1982)). Litchfield's four other causes of action were state
claims of unfair competition, misrepresentation of story authorship, breach of implied-in-fact
contract, and breach of confidence. Named defendants were Steven Spielberg, M.C.A., Inc.,
Universal City Studios, Inc., Extra-Terrestrial Productions, Kathleen Kennedy, Ned Tannen,
and Melissa Mathison.
3. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1354.
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The federal district court dismissed the Lanham Act allegation for
failure to state a claim, and, with it, the state claims of unfair competition
and misrepresentation of authorship.4 The court also granted Spielberg's
motion for summary judgment on the copyright infringement issue, in-
cluding derivative merchandising rights, on the basis of a finding of no
substantial similarity.5 The two remaining pendent state claims were dis-
missed at that time for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.6 Litchfield
appealed the summary judgment on the copyright issue to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which declared that no reasonable jury could find that the two
works were substantially similar. Therefore, summary judgment was
proper.7 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the Lanham Act claim, again because it agreed that there was no sub-
stantial similarity between the works.'
The court pointed out that, in order to prove copyright infringe-
ment, a plaintiff must show ownership of the copyright, access by the
defendant to the copyrighted work, and substantial similarity between
the copyrighted work and the defendant's work.9  Litchfield and
Spielberg agreed that Litchfield owned the copyright to "Lokey." For
purposes of the motion for summary judgment, defendants conceded
they had access.'0 The only issue to be resolved on appeal was whether
summary judgment was proper on the issue of substantial similarity."
In adjudicating the issue of substantial similarity, the court applied
the two-part analysis it set forth in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Produc-
tions Inc., v. McDonald's Corp. 2 In order to prove infringement under
4. Id. at 1355.
5. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,541 (C.D. Cal. June 10,
1983). Defendants moved for summary judgment only on the claim directed against the film.
The court found that, since the film was non-infringing, the derivative merchandising claims
should be included in the order as well.
6. Id.
7. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1358.
8. Id. Although Litchfield had not specifically appealed the district court's dismissal of
the unfair competition and story misrepresentation claims, the Ninth Circuit asserted jurisdic-
tion and held the dismissals proper since both claims were preempted by federal copyright law.
Id. The defendants questioned the court's jurisdiction over these claims since they were not
named in Litchfield's notice of appeal. The court held that because an appeal from a final
judgment calls in question all earlier rulings, the court can infer the additional intent to appeal
from a specific judgment as long as the appellee is not misled by the appellant's mistake. Id. at
1355. Since the federal claims had been dismissed prior to trial, the court also affirmed dismis-
sal of the pendent state claims of breach of implied-in-fact contract and breach of confidence.
Id. at 1358.
9. Id. at 1355.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). Sid & Marty Krofft Productions, Inc., who pro-
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Krofft, Litchfield had to show that the works in question were substan-
tially similar both in idea and in expression.13 The court explained that
similarity of idea could be shown through the use of an extrinsic test.
1 4
This test focuses on alleged similarities in the objective details of the
works by comparing plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and
sequence. "
Litchfield also produced a list of similarities between "Lokey" and
"E.T." to show extrinsic similarity.16 She argued that there were too
many similarities, especially in the sequence of events, for the court to
determine that there was no material issue of fact. 17 The court conceded
that it had relied on lists in the past for "illustrative purposes."1 " How-
ever, such lists were "inherently subjective," especially if they empha-
sized "random similarities scattered throughout the works," as
Litchfield's did.19 After reading "E.T.'s" continuity script2" and the two
versions of "Lokey," 21 the court held that the ideas presented in the two
works were not substantially similar and that any similarities in plot were
too general to warrant copyright protection.22 Although it could see
some similarity between the opening scenes, the court found no substan-
tial similarity between the sequence of events, mood, dialogue, and char-
duced the children's show, "H.R. Pufnstuf," sued McDonald's Corp. for infringing the copy-
right to their show by the production of "McDonaldland" television commercials. The court
found substantial similarity.
13. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Twentieth Century Fox v. M.C.A., Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 n.5 (9th Cir.
1983)).
19. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356.
20. A continuity script is a scenario that gives the complete action and scenes in detail and
in the order in which they are to be shown on the screen. The court held that basing its
comparison on "E.T.'s" continuity, rather than on the film itself, was permissible in this case
since neither party had claimed the continuity varied from the movie. It prudentially declined
to decide, however, whether reading a film's continuity script would provide a sufficient basis
for comparison with other works in all cases. Id. Litchfield did not ask the court to view the
movie.
21. The district court judge had read both versions of "Lokey," the continuity script of
"E.T.," and had viewed "E.T." in the defendants' screening room. Id. On appeal, Litchfield
claimed that it was prejudicial error for the district court judge to screen "E.T." outside the
presence of her counsel, and that the version shown might have differed in some material
respects from the version shown publicly. The Ninth Circuit declined to consider this objec-
tion as it was not raised below. Its review was held not necessary to prevent manifest injustice,
especially in light of the court's de novo review of the issue of substantial similarity. Id.
22. Id. at 1357.
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acters of the two works.23
The court explained that similarity of expression under Krofft would
depend on an intrinsic test focusing on the subjective response of the
"ordinary reasonable person" to the works in their entirety. 24 The court
found "even less" similarity of expression than idea, and stated that the
"total concept and feel" of the works were completely different.25 It
pointed out that, while "E.T." concentrated on the development of the
characters and the relationship between a boy and an extra-terrestrial,
"Lokey" used caricatures in developing its theme of mankind divided by
fear and hate.26 It concluded that no lay observer would recognize
"E.T." as a dramatization of "Lokey," and that summary judgment was
proper.27
Since it found no substantial similarity between the works, the court
also dismissed Litchfield's allegation that Spielberg violated Section
106(2) of the Copyright Act28 by preparing a "derivative work," "E.T.,"
based on "Lokey." Noting that the district court had not addressed this
issue, the court held that a violation of Section 106(2) of the Act would
require some form of incorporation of the copyrighted work into the in-
fringing work, and that "E.T." had neither incorporated nor substan-
tially copied any portion of "Lokey. ' ' 29 Litchfield argued that Section
106(2) of the Act was intended to expand the definition of "derivative
works" to include any work based on a copyrighted work, and that simi-
larities between the two works constituted the required "incorporation"
to show that "E.T." was based on "Lokey" for purposes of the statute.3 °
The court noted that Litchfield had cited no authority to support this
"novel proposition," and characterized Litchfield's arguments that Sec-
tion 106(2) of the Act radically altered the protection afforded by the
23. Id. at 1356-57. Although the Ninth Circuit did not address Litchfield's allegations
below that the character, E.T., infringed her character, Lokey, the district court found that
Lokey and Fundinkle were not "distinctively delineated" enough to warrant copyright protec-
tion. In the 1978 play, Lokey was described as a bald, egg-headed, grey-green five foot tall
boy, and Fundinkle, a giant firefly. In the 1980 screenplay outline, Lokey was simply a tall,
grey, hairless alien, but Fundinkle had grown to a three foot talking bug with a flashing phos-
phorous tail. (How could Hollywood resist?) The court found that neither one was the focus
of "Lokey." Litchfield v. Spielberg, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) $ 25,541 (C.D. Cal. June
10, 1983).
24. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356.
25. Id. at 1357.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982) grants a copyright owner exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works based upon the copyrighted work.
29. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357.
30. Id.
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copyright law as "frivolous."31 Works that are not substantially similar
are not protected by copyright law and, therefore, cannot be considered
derivative.32
Since it found no substantial similarity between the works, the
Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Lanham
Act claim.33 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act assigns liability for the use
of a false designation of origin in connection with any goods and services
put into commerce.3 4  The court referred to its holding in Smith v.
Montoro,35 in which it held that an actor could state a claim for "reverse
passing off"36 when a motion picture was mislabeled to mask his contri-
bution.37 Although the Litchfield court found reverse passing off to be
actionable under the Lanham Act if a plaintiff's mark has actually been
removed from his or her product, 38 it declined to decide whether the
doctrine would apply to cases of substantial similarity as well as to bodily
appropriation.39 Since there was no question of bodily appropriation of
Litchfield's work, and a finding that the works were not substantially
similar anyway, the court held that Litchfield could have no claim for
reverse passing off under Section 43(a).'
The court concluded with an observation that Litchfield's suit was
premised on an erroneous understanding of the extent of copyright pro-
tection.4" The copyright laws were designed to strike a balance between
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1358.
34. Section 43(a) of The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) provides, in part:
Any person who shall. . . use in connection with any goods or services. . . a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation . . . and shall cause
such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil action
• . . by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false designation or representation.
35. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).
36. Id. at 605. Reverse passing off is the removal of the name or make from someone else's
product so that it can be sold under a name chosen by the wrongdoer. Passing off is the selling
of a good or service of the wrongdoer's own creation under the name or mark of someone else.
Id. at 604.
37. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357-58. In Smith, the actor's name had been removed from
both film credits and advertising material.
38. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1358.
39. Id. The court referred to its decision in Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657
F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1981), which concerned an allegation of copyright infringement and
violation of the Lanham Act by a manufacturer of toy stuffed animals. In that case, the court
declined to decide whether a cause of action for reverse passing off could lie in cases of sub-
stantial similarity, as well as in cases of bodily appropriation, since the plaintiff had not raised
that question below.
40. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1358.
41. Id.
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the countervailing interests of protecting artists' creative expressions and
allowing free access to the pool of ideas which inspire those expressions.
The rule has always been that an idea is not protectable, but its concrete
expression is.42 The idea/expression dichotomy was codified in the
Copyright Act of 1976," expressly precluding copyright protection of
ideas.
Arguably, the line between an idea and its expression is a fine one.
In attempting to delineate the area of protection afforded by copyright
law, courts have searched for a yardstick with which to measure similar-
ity sufficient for infringement, i.e., substantial similarity. Judge Learned
Hand aptly observed that "[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to
when an imitator has gone beyond the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'ex-
pression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."'
The Ninth Circuit's use of the Krofft formula to determine which
elements of a copyrighted work are protected is at best an imprecise ana-
lytical tool, since it is difficult and often confusing45 to distinguish be-
tween a creative idea and its expression.
Because this conceptual difficulty often leads to ad hoc decisions,
Professor Nimmer suggests an approach to the analysis of substantial
similarity based on an examination of the pattern of the works.46 The
operative pattern to determine similarity would be in some degree ab-
stract, but still sufficiently concrete to indicate the sequence of events and
the interplay of the major characters.4 7
A concrete application of Professor Nimmer's overlay of patterns
approach can perhaps be seen in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
42. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] (1983).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
44. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] [1] (1983).
45. See generally Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 279 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960); see also Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 708, Twentieth Century Fox v.
M.C.A., Case No. CV 78-2437-IH (C.D. Cal. 1980) in which the court found the Krofft test
difficult to apply to feature-length motion pictures. The "facts involved in the Krofft case lent
themselves much easier than the facts of this case to an analysis of idea and expression of
ideas." The court further found it "almost impossible to reduce such a complex work to one
idea." The Fox case involved a claim that "Battlestar: Galactica" had infringed the copyright
of "Star Wars."
46. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1] (1983).
47. Id. An interesting illustration of this idea can be found in Professor Nimmer's thirteen
points of comparison between "West Side Story" and "Romeo and Juliet." It is Professor
Nimmer's contention that his thirteen points are sufficiently concrete to state the essential
sequence of events and character interplay to warrant a conclusion that the works are substan-
tially similar, although not all courts would accept the pattern as an sufficiently concrete ex-
pression of an idea. Id.
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MCA, Inc. , which dealt with alleged copyright infringement by the mo-
tion picture and television series, "Battlestar: Galactica," of the motion
picture, "Star Wars." The district court had granted summary judgment
for defendant MCA (the parent company of Universal Studios, which
produced and owned the rights to "Battlestar: Galactica"), finding that
the substantial differences in idea of the story lines and characters, and
the vastly different expressions of idea, precluded a finding of substantial
similarity as a matter of law.49 The Ninth Circuit, quoting "for illustra-
tive purposes only"50 thirteen of Professor Nimmer's thirty-four alleged
similarities, reversed and remanded for jury trial, holding that the films
raised genuine issues of material fact which should be resolved by way of
trial.
Although the Litchfield court stated that summary judgment is dis-
favored in cases involving intellectual property because substantial simi-
larity is such a close issue of fact, courts frequently decide the issue as a
matter of law.51 The Litchfield court's view, that this action was pre-
mised partly on a misunderstanding of the copyright law and partly on
an "obsessive conviction" among artists that others are plagiarizing their
work, 52 seems to indicate that summary judgment may effectively be
more favored in the future. Although the entertainment business will
undoubtedly continue to generate countless copyright infringement ac-
tions, the degree of protection afforded by courts will continue to be nar-
rowly defined.
Deirdre Crowe Beckett
48. 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 10, Fox v. MCA, Case No. CV 78-2437-IH
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
50. Fox, 715 F.2d at 1329 n.5.
51. See Jason v. Fonda, 648 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982) (Summary judgment affirmed as to
alleged infringement of the film, "Coming Home," of Jason's novel); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d
141 (9th Cir. 1983) (summary judgment affirmed as to two plays about surprised understudies,
much as in the classic Busby Berkeley musical "42nd Street," in which Ruby Keeler stepped
onto stage as a chorus girl, but was "gonna come back a star"); Warner Bros. v. Amer.
Brdcst'g Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirmed summary judgment as to the television
series, "Greatest American Hero," and the film, "Superman"). But see text accompanying
notes 48-50 supra.
52. Litchleld, 736 F.2d at 1358.
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B. Antitrust
1. Theatre "Splits" Under Fire: The Capitol Service Case
Theatre split arrangements have become a controversial practice in
recent years. Film exhibitors view "splits" as a legitimate business prac-
tice, offering the most efficient means for licensing motion pictures. Film
distributors view them as an unlawful attempt by exhibitors to insulate
themselves from economic competition. In United States v. Capitol Ser-
vice, Inc.,' these two views collided, with the distributors' view of splits
ultimately prevailing.
Under a split arrangement, theatre chains agree to refrain from bid-
ding against one another for the rights to exhibit first-run films. Instead,
film negotiation rights are divided among each of the chains participating
in the split. Negotiation with film distributors proceeds according to the
results of this division, with each chain authorized to negotiate only for
those films it receives through the split.2
The Capitol Service case involved a federal antitrust challenge3 to a
split arrangement operating in Milwaukee. The government claimed that
the split posed an unlawful restraint on competition. After a trial lasting
over a month, the Wisconsin district court ultimately agreed, holding
that the Milwaukee split constituted a per se violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.4
Defendants to the federal claim were four motion picture exhibitors
operating theatres in Milwaukee.' The exhibitors denied that any unlaw-
ful restraint could be attributed to their agreement. Even assuming the
existence of a restraint, the exhibitors argued that under the rule of rea-
l. 568 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
2. The division of films through the split takes place at periodic meetings scheduled by
participating exhibitors. At these meetings exhibitors take turns selecting certain films to play
at their theatres. Each exhibitor then has the exclusive rights to negotiate for those films it has
chosen through the split. Id. at 140-41.
3. Id. at 135. Suit was brought by the Antitrust Division of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Act specifies: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
5. The four exhibitors were Capitol Service, Inc., Kohlberg Theatres Service Corp., Mar-
cus Theatres Corp., and United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. Of the four, U.A.T.C. is the most
prominent, as the second largest motion picture exhibitor in the United States behind the
largest, General Cinema Corporation. Kohlberg's business is limited to Wisconsin and neigh-
boring states. Marcus and Capitol Service operate theatres exclusively in Wisconsin. Capitol
Serv., 568 F. Supp. at 138-39.
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son, such a restraint would be outweighed by the split's pro-competitive
advantages.6 Unlike the per se doctrine, under which certain market
practices are conclusively presumed unreasonable,7 the rule of reason al-
lows for an extended inquiry into a challenged market arrangement. 8
Under the rule of reason, a court looks to the overall impact of the par-
ticular trade practice, weighing its pro and anti-competitive aspects to
determine if it is reasonable.9
The court refused to allow an extended inquiry into the exhibitors'
split. Prompting the court's decision was the deposition testimony of ex-
ecutives from each of the four theatre chains, which left little doubt as to
the exhibitors' purpose in entering the split. l It was through the split,
the court concluded from the testimony, that the exhibitors sought to
reverse the high prices being paid to distributors through the competitive
bidding process."' Evidence of such a direct attempt to restrain competi-
tion, in conflict with the dictates of the Sherman Act, proved influential
in the court's decision to hold the split per se illegal.
6. Id. at 153. The exhibitors claimed that the split resulted in numerous advantages that
actually benefitted competition. These advantages included greater efficiency in the licensing
of films, better access to popular films for the movie-going public, increased opportunity for
less prominent distributors to obtain first-run theatres for their films, and the elimination of
"blind bidding." Blind bidding requires exhibitors to bid on motion pictures based on limited
information. For example, exhibitors might be requested to submit bids on a picture with no
more than a list of proposed actors for the film or a brief description of the picture's theme.
Extremely unpopular among exhibitors, this practice has been statutorily prohibited in twenty-
three states. Id. at 138.
7. Id. at 149. For a valuable discussion of the development of the per se doctrine, and its
present role in antitrust analysis, see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
§ 67 at 182-86, §§ 70-72, at 192-97 (1977).
8. Capitol Serv., 568 F. Supp. at 148-49. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, § 68-69 at
186-92, § 72 at 195-97.
9. The exhibitors offered two cases as authority for application of the rule of reason. In
Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 511 F. Supp. 1046, 1060 (W.D. Va. 1981), the rule of
reason was held applicable to a split agreement operating in Charlottesville, Virginia. Pointing
to the criticism of the Greenbrier decision in the more recent case of General Cinema Corp. v.
Buena Vista Distribution Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1265-66 (C.D. Cal. 1982), the Wisconsin
district court stated that the General Cinema decision provided a much more complete analy-
sis of splits and the rationale for their per se illegality. Capitol Serv., 568 F. Supp. at 152-53.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Brdcst'g Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1979), the Court
held that the blanket licensing of performance rights sold by copyright clearinghouses could
not properly be analyzed under the per se rule because of benefits achieved through blanket
licensing of rights not otherwise available through individual licensing. Noting the absence of
any finding in Broadcast Music that the challenged licenses had any effect or purpose to re-
strain competition in the market, the Capitol Service court distinguished the exhibitors' split
through its anti-competitive purpose and consequent impact in restraining competition for film
licenses in Milwaukee. Based upon this and other distinguishing features, the court concluded
that reliance upon Broadcast Music was unfounded. Capitol Sery., at 568 F. Supp. at 150-51.
10. Id. at 140-42.
11. Id. at 142-43.
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Equally significant to the court was the split's function as a price-
fixing agreement, which allowed participating exhibitors to assume con-
trol over film negotiations in the Milwaukee market. The split enabled
each exhibitor to exercise exclusive negotiating power over designated
films. The effect of such a power, the court concluded, was to allow the
exhibitors to avoid direct competition and to exert direct influence over
the price of motion pictures licensed in Milwaukee. 2
Classification of the split as a price-fixing agreement13 was instru-
mental to the court's resolution of the case."4 Both in its purpose and
effect, concluded the court, the patently anti-competitive nature of the
exhibitors' split arrangement necessitated its condemnation as a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Based upon the court's belief in the appli-
cability of this reasoning to all forms of theatre split arrangements, the
defendants were ordered enjoined throughout the United States from fur-
ther participation in splits.1
12. Id. at 146-48. Influence over price was exercised primarily through reductions in film
guarantees, rental payments, and motion picture playtime made possible through the negotiat-
ing leverage of the split. Guarantees are minimum payments from exhibitors made in advance
of a film's exhibition, and retained by the distributor regardless of how well the film does at the
box office. Film rentals are payments based on a percentage of the profits a distributor is
entitled to collect from an exhibitor for the right to exhibit the distributor's film. Motion
picture playtimes refers simply to the length of time a film remains at a particular theatre. Id.
at 137.
13. The court held that the division of motion pictures through the split, coupled with the
exhibitors' purpose of eliminating competition for those pictures, provided an additional basis
for the per se condemnation of the Milwaukee split as an illegal market allocation. Id. at 154-
55.
14. Id. at 149-50. Two Supreme Court cases provided the authoritative foundation for the
district court's finding of per se illegality. In United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392,
397-98 (1927), the Court concluded:
The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to con-
trol the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. . . . Agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or
unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular
price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government
in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it
has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions.
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940), the Court added:
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful ac-
tivity. Even though the members of the price fixing group were in no position to
control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they
would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The Acts places all
such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital part of our economy against any
degree of interference.
For two more recent cases, similarly holding price-fixing agreements to be illegal per se,
see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) and Catalano v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). Capitol Sery., 568 F. Supp. at 150.
15. 568 F. Supp. at 155. The court relied upon United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88-95 (1950) as authority for its broad order. While not appealing the sub-
1985]
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The decision of the Wisconsin district court represents the second of
two recent attacks on theatre split arrangements. In the case of General
Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distribution Co. ,6 a distributor challenged
a series of split arrangements entered into by the nation's largest motion
picture exhibitor. 7 The General Cinema court held that each of the
challenged agreements constituted a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. 
18
Should the trend established through these decisions remain intact,
the enforced proscription of theatre splits could place theatre owners be-
tween the horns of a dilemma. Unable to rely upon the traditionally
effective operation of the split, theatre owners could be forced to adopt
more overt measures to adopt the high costs of licensing films, e.g., fur-
ther increases in currently steep box office prices. Such a situation would
be untimely, with the video casette and subscription television industries
already impacting heavily upon theatre attendance.
Already forced to contend with dropping attendance at their thea-
tres, the recent decisions against theatre splits can hardly be comforting
to theatre owners. Yet the ban of split arrangements appears to be the
reality they must face. If recent decisions indicate the prevailing trend,
theatre split arrangements may be headed the route of the silent film and
ten cent popcorn.
Steven Lee Monette
stantive finding of the district court that theatre splits are per se illegal, the Milwaukee defend-
ants did appeal the validity of the court's nation-wide injunction. Telephone interview with
Trevor J. Will, Foley & Lardner, attorneys for defendants (Sept. 7, 1984).
16. 532 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1982). See supra note 9.
17. General Cinema itself had brought the original action, challenging Buena Vista's im-
position of minimum film rental payments as unlawful price-fixing under the Sherman Act.
Buena Vista then counterclaimed, challenging General Cinema's participation in splits.
18. 532 F. Supp. at 1279.
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